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Creating Safety in the Testing Process  
in Primary Care Offices  
Nancy C. Elder, MD, MSPH; Timothy R. McEwen; John M. Flach, PhD;  
Jennie J. Gallimore, PhD 
 
Abstract 
Background:  The testing process in primary care is complex, and it varies from one office to 
another. We sought to understand how family medicine offices create safety in this process. 
Methods:  Using observations, interviews, and surveys, we collected data at four family 
medicine offices. We searched the interview and observation notes for stories of safety, error 
prevention, and recovery and coded them to a model of resilient engineering properties, work 
system components, and testing process steps. Results: We found only six examples of practices 
that were systematically creating safety in the testing process via organizational resilience. The 
most common resilience properties were top-level commitment and a learning culture applied to 
work system components of people and their tasks. Offices predominantly depended on 
individuals to double-check, remember, and work around ongoing problems. 
Conclusions: While family medicine offices overwhelming depend on individuals to work 
around testing process problems, important properties of office-wide safety practices included a 
top-level commitment and a learning culture.  
 
Introduction 
The doctor-patient relationship has long been considered the center of primary medical care. 
However, this relationship does not occur in a vacuum. Each office visit is supported by systems 
of individuals, procedures, technologies, regulations, and organizational structure. This larger 
system has a significant impact on patient care. Researchers have recently begun to take a more 
global perspective on primary care and to evaluate the impact of the larger system on the quality 
of patient care.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10  
e 
 
One of the most common and important processes in primary care is testing. Tests ordered in 
primary care include laboratory, imaging, and special tests (e.g., cardiac stress tests, 
electromyograms). The testing process can be defined as all the steps that occur from the time a 
physician decides to order a test until the appropriate followup action is discussed with the 
patient and follow-though has occurred.  
 
Some low complexity tests are performed in physicians’ offices, but most tests are sent to outside 
facilities. Previous work11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 has led to an understanding of the steps that 
make up the testing process in primary care and delineated the steps in which physicians and 
their staff members perceive the most errors occurring.11, 12, 14, 16, 17 Although some authors hav
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broken these actions down into “pre-analytical, analytical and post-analytical” phases,15, 20 w
have expanded the pre- and post-analytical office-based actions into a series of steps, which 
taken together define the testing process (Figur
e 
e 1): 
 
• Ordering: A physician makes a decision to obtain a test and communicates that decision to 
the appropriate personnel. 
• Implementation: The order is transmitted to those performing the test and/or obtaining the 
specimen(s); the patient is prepared for the test and/or the specimen(s) are obtained.  
• Tracking: The test order is monitored internally (within the primary care practice) until the 
results are returned. 
• Return of results: The results are sent back to the office (and to the physician) from testing 
facilities or locations.  
• Response: The physician makes a decision as to the meaning of the results and creates an 
action plan. 
• Documentation: Physician and/or staff note in the medical record that the result has been 
reviewed; that the physician has responded to the result; and that the patient has been 
notified. 
• Notification: The patient is informed of his/her test result and the physician’s 
recommendations for action.    
• Followup: The process whereby abnormal results and/or results requiring action are 
monitored until such action is taken or the patient refuses the action.  
 
In a field as complex as medicine, there are multiple potential sources of ambiguity (e.g., patients 
with similar names) and small mistakes (e.g., incorrect filing of a test result) that can cascade 
into consequences disproportionate to their sources (e.g., allowing a critical condition to go 
untreated). Testing represents a common arena for these types of errors. Recent estimates show 
that the average family physician and general internist order laboratory tests in 29 percent and  
38 percent of patient visits, respectively, and imaging studies in 10 percent and 12 percent,  
Figure 1. Steps in the testing process in primary care.  
Source: Adapted from Hickner JM, Fernald DH, Harris DM, et al. Issues and initiatives in the testing process in 
primary care physician offices. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Safety 2005; 31: 81-89.   
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respectively.13 Therefore, it is not surprising that errors associated with these events are 
common; 15 to 54 percent of primary care medical errors reported by physicians and their staffs 
are related to the testing process.12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24  
 
Errors have been reported in all office-based testing process steps, but those that occur in 
association with the implementation and return of results are the most frequently reported.12, 15, 21 
Although these errors have rarely been associated with significant physical harm to patients, 
adverse consequences, including emotional distress, financial loss, and delay of diagnosis and 
treatment are common.12  
 
The road to improved systems begins with an understanding of the testing process within the 
larger practice system.25 The testing process can be described as a distributed cognitive system 
or a work system, where multiple people, tasks, technologies, and environmental and 
organizational factors interact to determine the ou 2, 26, 27tcome.   
 
In order to move the focus from what is wrong with the testing process to what works well, we 
have framed our research in the context of resilient systems engineering.28 In this context, a 
resilient testing process is viewed as a system process capable of adaptively learning to correct 
errors and to take advantage of new opportunities (e.g., information technology) to improve 
quality.28, 29, 30 Safety and resilience are not static properties of an organization but reflect a 
dynamic struggle to create safety. The properties necessary for resilient organizations have been 
described as follows:30  
 
• Top-level commitment: Top management recognizes performance concerns and addresses 
them with continuous and extensive follow-through.  
• Just culture: Reporting of issues, problems, events, and errors throughout the organization is 
supported, but culpable behaviors are not tolerated.  
• Learning culture: Issues, problems, events, and errors are handled with an eye toward repair 
and true reform, not denial. 
• Opacity: Management is aware of how close they are to having serious problems and events 
due to weak safety defenses. 
• Awareness: Management collects ongoing data to gather insight into quality of performance, 
problems, and the state of safety defenses. 
• Preparedness: Management actively anticipates problems and prepares for them. 
• Flexibility: New or complex problems are handled in a way that maximizes the ability to 
solve the problem without disrupting overall work. 
 
To best understand how to increase safety in the testing process, we believe a model must 
describe both the complexities of the work place system and the existence of resilience properties 
in that practice (Figure 2). Resilience properties, such as those listed above, are exhibited 
through the work system: that is, the people, tasks, tools and technologies, environment, and 
organizational structure of the practice.  
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Figure 2. Creating safety: A model of possible components of officewide safety practices in family 
medicine offices. 
Note: For an organization to create safety, it must develop officewide safety practices that incorporate one 
or more properties of resilience. These properties are used within one or more work system components 
that center on the person. 
Source: Adapted from components noted by Carayon, Schoofs Hundt, Karsh, et al., 2006; and Wreathall, 
2006. 
In the current study, we applied this model to describe how family medicine offices enhance 
safety. As part of a larger multimethod study of actual testing process performance in primary 
care, we analyzed observations and interviews in family medicine offices in order to describe 
how these offices are working to improve quality and decrease errors in the testing process. 
Specifically, we asked these general questions:  
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1. How do offices safely manage the multiple steps of the testing process?  
2. What work system components and resilience properties do offices use to enhance safety in 
the testing process? 
 
Methods 
To better understand the testing process in primary care, we elected to intensively study four 
family medicine offices. Each office was visited for 2 to 4 days, with other data obtained before 
and after these visits by phone, e-mail, postal mail, and personal visits. The study was conducted 
between December 2006 and June 2007.  
 
We used data collection methods that allowed us to gather the maximal amount of information 
while causing minimal interference to patient care and productivity. As data were collected at 
each site, we also conducted ongoing discussion and analyses. This approach allowed each day’s 
visit to build on the previously collected data.  
 
This study received approval from the University of Cincinnati and Wright State University 
Institutional Review Boards. 
 
Participant Selection 
Financial constraints limited our participants to southwest Ohio. However, within that region, we 
purposefully selected offices that offered a variation of demographic and geographic factors that 
might influence how practice systems operate. For example, we specifically sought variation in: 
 
• Geographic location (rural, suburban, urban). 
• Physician diversity (sex, race, ethnicity). 
• Practice size.  
• Patient socioeconomic status (percentage of private, Medicaid, Medicare, or self-pay payer 
source). 
• Technology level (electronic health record, no EHR). 
• Residency program (program, no program). 
 
Practices were identified by personal knowledge of the principal investigator (a family physician 
in Cincinnati); from recommendations of other physicians and nurses in the community; and via 
e-mails, letters, and phone calls to practice groups in the region that fit some of the above 
criteria. After participation, each practice received a detailed report outlining their specific 
testing process safety threats and strengths, including recommendations for improvements. Each 
practice also received a $400.00 honorarium to be used for educational or support purposes 
within the practice. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Multiple methods of data collection were employed in the larger study, including: 
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• Paper questionnaires that were filled in by office staff. These included a survey adapted from 
the American Academy of Family Physicians National Research Network11, 12 and surveys on 
office demographics and social networking. 
• Direct observations, which occasionally were supplemented by talk-aloud protocols. 
• Chart audits of test orders, results, and patient notification. 
• Work analysis interviews of key informants. 
• Patient surveys of their experiences with having a test performed and then receiving results.  
• Collection of written documents and forms from the office. Most of these data were collected 
during the 2- to 4-day visit at each office by two members of the research team: a family 
physician researcher and a human factors psychology graduate student. Some forms, surveys, 
and interviews were also completed before and after the visit.  
 
While all of the data collected served as background for the researchers, this research on creating 
safety in the testing process analyzed the observation notes and the key informant interview 
notes and transcripts. All notes and transcripts were “de-identified” prior to analysis. The 
observation notes, made daily by both researchers, were iteratively discussed and reviewed, and 
at the conclusion of the site visit, a summary set of notes was made, highlighting the findings at 
each step in the testing process.  
 
The interviews, which focused on individual patients’ experiences with the testing process—
including stories of problems, mistakes, and errors—were audiotaped, and extensive notes were 
taken for each interview. Selected portions of the tapes were also transcribed. All notes and 
transcripts were entered into the qualitative software program NVivo 2.0. Each document was 
searched for stories and examples of safety strengths. When applicable, each such finding was 
also coded to the step (or steps) in the testing process where it occurred, the components of the 
work system involved, and the properties of resilience it represented. Two members of the 
research team developed the coding strategy by reviewing and coding the interview documents 
together. The interview documents were then re-read, and all of the observation notes were 
coded using the final coding strategy. All researchers reviewed and discussed the findings after 
coding was completed. 
 
Results 
Testing Process Complexity 
Prior to describing how these offices created safety, we will briefly describe the offices and the 
complexity of their testing processes. While the four medical offices we studied ranged in size, 
location, and patient characteristics (Table 1), they all performed a complicated series of tasks to 
move from a physician test order through patient notification and followup.  
 
All of the offices performed some of their own low-complexity laboratory testing, but they sent 
the majority of their laboratory work to hospital or reference laboratories. Only one site had its 
own radiology suite and staff for plain films; all the others used nearby hospitals and free 
standing radiology centers for imaging and special tests. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of participating family medicine offices 
Characteristic 
Office 1 
(Suburban) 
Office 2 
(Urban) 
Office 3 
(Rural) 
Office 4 
(Suburban) 
Physicians/providers (N) 
 Full time 7 2 4 1 
 Part time 6 2 0 3 
 Resident 0 0 12 0 
Female physicians/providers (N) 7 3 8 2 
African American physicians/ 
providers (N) 0 1 1 0 
Staff (N) 
 Full time 23 9 16 1* 
 Part time 2 0 4 0 
Patient payer mix 
 Insured (%) 50 24 35 47 
 Medicare (%) 45 41 30 47 
 Medicaid (%) 0 17 25 1 
 Self-pay (%) 5 18 10 1 
Residency practice No No Yes No 
Electronic health record No No No Yes 
Outside laboratories used (N) 1 1 2 2 
Outside radiology centers used (N) >6 2 3 3 
* Contracts with outside phlebotomy, receptionist, and health system billing office 
 
We found variation both between practices and within practices. For all practices, the type of test 
ordered (laboratory, imaging, or special test) and the site where it was conducted (office, 
reference laboratory, or hospital) affected the specific tasks performed. For example, at one 
office, the procedure was as follows: a physician ordered an imaging test at a local hospital via a 
written prescription, received the results by fax days later, and then waited for the patient to 
return for a followup office visit for patient notification. At this same office, physicians’ 
laboratory test orders were handwritten on the billing sheet; test samples were obtained by a 
medical assistant (MA) who entered the orders into an onsite laboratory computer terminal; 
results were returned via a dedicated printer the next day; and patients were notified of their 
results by mail.  
 
Within offices, the procedure for ordering tests and managing results occasionally varied among 
individual providers and staff for identical tests performed at the same location. While each 
practice had preferred reference laboratories and radiology centers, a patient’s insurance status 
occasionally necessitated using different testing sites (often requiring different tasks.) 
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No single individual at any of the offices, including the office manager or medical director, could 
describe all the tasks involved in any of the testing processes. However, these administrators 
were more aware of the general process flow than were the MAs, physicians, or clerical staff, 
who rarely knew what happened to an order, sample, or result before it came to them or after it 
left them.  
 
None of the offices had written protocols for all of their testing processes; two offices had no 
written protocols at all; and the other two offices had protocols for some, but not all of the testing 
process steps and tasks. There were physicians and staff at every office who, when asked to tell 
us “what happens next with this…” described tasks and processes that were totally incorrect. For 
example, at one office, a physician, when asked what happened to test results that came back 
when he was absent from the office, noted that the MA reviewed them all and sent all abnormal 
results to a partner for review and action. However, the MA remarked that this was not one of 
her duties, and that she had never performed those actions. 
 
Creating Safety  
As mentioned earlier, safety is not a static property of any system. There is no such thing as an 
inherently safe process or device. Anything may become dangerous in the wrong situation. For 
instance, sending test results to a physician’s inbox to be reviewed seems like it ought to be a 
safe practice, and it usually is, unless the physician is out of town. Safety is an emergent property 
of a system that is created through the interactions of the people, tasks, technologies, 
environment, and organization within the context of what is appropriate for the given situation. 
In searching for the ways that offices safely manage the steps of the testing process, we found 
few examples of systematic officewide organizational practices for testing process safety. 
Instead, most efforts to assure quality in the testing process reflected localized responses of 
individual staff members and patients to double check, remember, work around, mitigate, and 
recover from potential and actual problems. We found only six examples of systematic 
officewide adaptations to improve resilience. 
 
Localized Safety 
The vast majority of testing process safety procedures were created by individuals who 
performed their separate tasks by working around dysfunctional systems, depending on their 
memory or memory aides (e.g., sticky notes, holding onto charts, copies of notes or orders), and 
performing multiple double-checks. Although these individuals employed the resilience factors 
of preparedness and awareness, they did so as individuals and not as part of an organization. For 
example, an MA at one office, aware that test results might not be filed and would need to be 
found, would check each scheduled patient’s chart for test results at the beginning of each day. 
Knowing that orders often get lost, a clerical staff member at another office said that she always 
copied each order that crossed her desk, preparing for those that would eventually get lost when 
sent to the hospital. But these are isolated actions performed by a few individuals, and they were 
not always done on a consistent basis.  
 
Physicians and staff tended to work around system problems rather than try to solve them. When 
employees developed workable systems to order, track, or respond to results, they did not share 
 8
their systems with others. Others would cling to a clumsy or untenable practice because “…it 
works for me.” In both large and small offices, we frequently heard, “I don’t know how others do 
it, but this is what I do.” For example, a physician stated, “If there’s a patient I’m really 
concerned about, I will write their name down and put it in my inbox. That way, every time I 
look into my box, I see the patient’s name.”  An MA said, “I feel that my memory is my greatest 
asset. I can remember nearly all the charts that are waiting in a doctor’s office for results.” 
 
Organizational Safety  
As noted above, we observed six instances that we felt fit within the “creating safety model” of 
officewide safety practices (Figure 2). One office had four safety practices; one had two; one had 
one; and one had none. The only demographic characteristic of the offices that separated them 
was the presence of a residency program at the office with four safety practices. These safety 
practices are described in Table 2, along with the major work system components and resilience 
properties involved.  
 
All of these safety practices involved the support and involvement of the entire office 
organization. How people performed their tasks was influenced by these organizational 
decisions. In three of the safety practices, specific tools were also used (e.g., computer printouts, 
date and signature stamps, and standardized patient correspondence forms). Although one safety 
practice influenced the overall safety culture of the office, the other practices all dealt with steps 
in the testing process: tracking and return of results (one safety practice) and response to results, 
documentation, patient notification and followup (four safety practices). We did not find any 
examples of officewide safety practices involving the ordering or implementation of tests.  
 
The main resilience property found in these safety practices was the use of a learning culture. In 
almost all the cases described, the successful safety practice grew out of experiences with error, 
failure, or adverse events. The office organization then responded to the events with the 
development and implementation of the described safety practices. It was (and continues to be) a 
top-level commitment to these safety practices that is largely responsible for the success of these 
safety practices. In the two offices with one or no examples of organizational resilience, a top-
level commitment to safety was noticeably absent.  
 
Two other resilience properties were each found in one safety practice. There was awareness in 
the safety practice of abnormal Pap smear review. Data gathered about the management of 
abnormal Pap smears gave the clinic administration insight into what was going on regarding the 
quality of Pap smear care. We also found flexibility in those practices that used patient 
communication tools both to document physician response to a test result and to notify patients. 
When standardized throughout the office, these tools solved the problem of notifying patients 
about results without increasing work for the physician. We found no examples of opacity, 
preparedness, or a just culture within any of these organizational safety practices. 
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Table 2. Creating safety in the testing process: Organizational safety practices 
 identified in family medicine offices and their associated testing 
 process steps, work system components, and resilience properties  
Description of safety practice 
Steps in testing 
process 
Work system 
components 
Resilience 
properties 
Only one group of staff members 
(file clerks) is allowed to file results 
into charts and to file charts in 
medical records. This group is 
trained by management on what is 
required on results (e.g., 
signature) prior to filing. 
• Response to 
results 
• Documentation 
• Person 
• Tasks 
• Organization 
• Top level 
commitment 
• Learning 
Culture 
Staff and management write 
policies and procedures together 
for testing process protocols. 
• Safety culture 
• Person 
• Tasks 
• Organization 
• Top level 
commitment 
• Learning culture 
Pap smear quality review requires 
that copies of all abnormal Pap 
smears be reviewed by a nurse for 
followup according to a physician- 
developed protocol. This review is 
given to management monthly. 
• Response to 
results 
• Followup 
• Person 
• Tasks 
• Organization 
• Top level 
commitment 
• Learning culture 
• Awareness 
Development and use of a stamp 
on all test results, with spaces for 
dates, signatures, and notes by 
physician and nurses. 
• Response to 
results 
• Documentation 
• Person 
• Tasks 
• Organization 
• Technology and 
tools 
• Top level 
commitment 
• Learning culture 
A printout of all laboratory orders 
to the main reference laboratory is 
maintained: daily, an assigned MA 
marks the results returned; 
weekly, every MA reviews the 
printout for his/her doctors’ 
patients’ results; monthly, an 
assigned MA double-checks it for 
any results not yet returned. 
• Tracking  
• Return of results 
• Person 
• Tasks 
• Organization 
• Technology and 
tools  
• Top level 
commitment 
• Learning culture 
Standardized use of 
correspondence to the patient 
(e.g., letter, copy of handwritten 
note on actual result, check-box 
card) serves as documentation of 
the physician’s response to the 
results and patient notification of 
results. (Found at two office sites) 
• Response to 
results 
• Documentation 
• Patient notification 
• Person 
• Tasks 
• Organization 
• Technology and 
tools  
• Top level 
commitment 
• Learning culture 
• Flexibility 
MA = medical assistant 
Management = office manager, head nurse, and/or medical director 
Staff = medical assistants, nurses, clerical staff 
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Discussion 
Physicians order tests on their patients to screen for and diagnose disease, monitor treatment, and 
prevent complications. It is such a routine part of practice in primary care that physicians tend to 
give little thought to all the people, steps, and tasks that allow them to order a test today and 
receive a result tomorrow. But when an abnormal Pap smear is filed without physician review, or 
when a chest x-ray reveals a suspicious nodule but is never followed up, then physicians (and 
patients) ask, “What went wrong?”   
 
In recent years, testing process research, especially in practice-based research networks, has 
focused on answering the “What went wrong?” question.11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 23, 24 However, it is equally 
important to answer the “What works well?” question.16, 31 “Creating safety” is one way to think 
about “What works well.” We found that creating safety was only rarely done via officewide 
safety practices. Instead, it depended on individual conscientiousness. Within our model of 
creating safety, we found that most officewide safety practices were characterized by a top-level 
commitment and a learning culture, and that these practices focused primarily on people and 
their tasks. Office practices without these organizational resilience properties depend almost 
exclusively on individuals working around dysfunctional systems to create safety.  
 
Only a few officewide testing process safety practices were identified at these offices, but by 
examining these in the context of resilient systems, it is possible to better identify what family 
medicine offices need to do to create safety. The consistent resilience properties we found were a 
top-level commitment and a learning culture. Office improvement programs, such as the 
TransforMEDSM program of the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)32 and the 
Clinical Microsystems initiatives,33, 34 note the importance of these factors in successfully 
implementing quality initiatives. While all of Wreathall’s organizational resilience properties30 
are important to the development of the highest quality office practices, using a learning culture 
to identify and remedy the immediate areas at risk, backed by a top-level commitment to address 
them with continuous and extensive follow-through, are natural starting places.  
 
The organizational testing process safety practices also focused on the most elemental of work 
system components: the person and their tasks. While this is the logical and most appropriate 
starting place for safety practices, ultimately, incorporating technology, tools, and even 
environmental changes for safety will also be necessary.2 
 
Since this was an exploratory study of only four primary care practice offices, we cannot 
determine whether demographic factors about the office were associated with the use of 
resilience factors. Although the residency office did have more safety practices, future research 
will be necessary to tell if that is true of training programs in general or just this specific office. 
In order to achieve an expansive view of testing process safety, we chose to study offices with a 
variety of demographic and geographic factors. Future research will also be necessary to study 
how incorporating safety practices will actually affect outcomes of patient care, including quality 
indicators, adverse events, harm, and patient satisfaction. 
 
In offices without organizational resilience, safety is maintained almost exclusively by the 
diligence and conscientiousness of individual employees (and patients). While this diligence is 
important in even the most resilient organizations,28, 35 when it is applied mainly to working 
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around dysfunctional systems rather than searching for, finding, ameliorating, and reporting the 
few errors that slip through, then the status quo persists, and little progress is made toward safety 
and quality.36  
 
In the participating offices, we found many examples of individuals who had developed their 
own way of implementing orders, notifying patients, or keeping track of results and followup 
actions, either because no officewide system existed or because they found the existing system 
ineffective or cumbersome. There was little if any discussion of these methods among office 
physicians and staff. Unfortunately, when these individuals were absent or found themselves 
working with others or in different locations in the office, their “work-arounds” tended to fall 
apart, and problems ensued. While allowing daily work to proceed, the overall quality of the 
office suffers when safety depends on individual diligence. 
 
It is interesting to note that at the four offices we studied, no one could fully describe the testing 
processes that existed in their offices, and there were many misconceptions about what took 
place in their work setting. This is in no small part due to how complex these processes are. The 
role of complexity in health care, and in ambulatory care, is becoming more important, 
especially as a factor in safety and quality.37, 38, 39  
 
The fact that workers do not know what tasks their coworkers perform is consistent with our 
finding that individuals at these medical offices often perform their tasks in relative isolation. 
Yet, teamwork is one of the strongest components of safe and successful health care units.40, 41; 
Instruments that measure safety culture include major sections on teamwork.42  
 
Teamwork is a necessary component to move beyond the attitude that maintains, “I don’t know 
how others do it, but this is what I do.” Some such processes may be excellent, but when 
performed in isolation, without organizational system support, and surrounded by several other 
methods for performing the same tasks and steps, inconsistency, confusion, and error are likely 
outcomes. This is why standardization is a common and well-accepted tenet of effective safety 
practices.43, 44  
 
Moving beyond the stage of individuals working independently is important in creating a safer 
system because it allows individuals to better coordinate their efforts. Through better 
coordination, the system will change from an open-loop process to a process that includes 
feedback, allowing for a system that can change in response to the ever-changing circumstances 
that face those working in ambulatory care.  
 
Conclusion 
The testing process, a common and important function in primary care offices, can be studied 
using numerous methods from human factors, cognitive systems engineering, and resilience 
engineering. There are dozens of tasks to be performed by multiple people to complete the 
testing process, from an initial order through patient notification and followup. The family 
medicine offices we studied depended on individuals to be diligent with their memory and to do 
double-checks and work arounds in order to provide safe testing care. We did identify a handful 
of officewide testing process safety practices. These offices incorporated a learning culture to 
 12
identify and remedy areas at risk, backed by a top-level commitment to continuous and extensive 
follow-through. Further work is needed to study additional primary care offices to see if these 
findings are consistent and to find and implement best practices to assist offices in moving 
toward increased organizational resilience. 
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